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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of five globalization variables on sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides 
emissions in Europe from 1980-2000 in the framework of one empirical model. The spatial autoregressive 
regression model is estimated using 2SLS. The five variables of interest are trade, foreign direct 
investment, neighboring countries wealth, cross-border pollution and participation in international 
environmental treaties. I then omit each of the globalization effects one at a time and find that omitted 
variable bias would be significant for four of the globalization variables, the exception being neighbors’ 
wealth.  
JEL Classifications: F18, Q53, Q58 
Keywords: Globalization, environment, spatial econometrics 
1. Introduction 
Disagreement about the relationship between globalization and the environment 
remains an unresolved issue. Theoretical predictions of the effects of globalization are 
often ambiguous.
2 Therefore, empirical work must provide evidence of the actual 
impact on the environment. This study looks at five globalization effects predicted to 
affect the environment. Three aspects of globalization – trade, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and international environmental treaty participation – have received a fair share 
of attention. Even so, Antweiler et al. (2001) is the only study to include all three of 
these effects. Less attention has been given to cross-border pollution and nearby 
countries’ wealth effects. Maddison (2006) is the only study to consider these spatial 
variables, but he excludes the other three globalization variables. I estimate European 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions between 1980 and 2000 
within one empirical model including five different globalization variables.
  
Increased globalization allows countries to strategically affect each other. For 
example, countries can use trade relations to persuade their polluting neighbors to lower 
emissions or join international environmental treaties. FDI can contribute to a country’s 
emissions via technology transfer or by responding to lax environmental regulation, but 
it is also closely related to a country’s trade. Countries that are poor relative to their 
neighbors may serve as pollution havens and thus have higher emission levels. These 
same countries also trade more because of large markets nearby. While the links 
between emissions and these globalization variables have separately been studied before, 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, University of Montana, Missoula, MT 59812, USA. Email: 
helen.naughton@umontana.edu. I thank two anonymous referees, Ronald B. Davies, Bruce A. 
Blonigen, Trudy A. Cameron, Glen R. Waddell, Michael V. Russo and the participants of the European 
Trade Study Group conference, the European Summer School in Resource and Environmental 
Economics “Trade, Property Rights and Biodiversity,” and the Oregon Ad hoc Workshop in 
Environmental and Resource Economics. 
2 Sources of these ambiguities for trade’s effect on the environment, for example, are discussed by 
Copeland and Taylor (2003).  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
504 
the correlations between the globalization variables must be considered as well. I do that 
by estimating models while omitting relevant globalization variables. 
Many previous studies relating trade to environment use international air quality 
data, but the theoretical link between trade and the environment emerges through 
emissions, not air quality.
3 Using air quality rather than emissions data may be 
problematic because air quality does not only depend on local emissions but is also a 
function of many geo-spatial factors and cross-border pollution. Aggregating air quality 
data across cities to form an air quality index for a country may also not be appropriate.
4  
Figure 1 plots sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions against mean SO2 concentrations in 
1995 for 28 countries. The correlation between these two variables is only 0.048, 
suggesting that air quality data may not be an appropriate proxy for emissions. In Figure 
2 nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions are plotted against nitrogen dioxide (NO2) 
concentrations for 26 countries in 1995.
 5  Again, there is only a 0.098 correlation 
between emissions and air quality. While controlling for monitoring-site specific 
characteristics alleviates some of the problems with air quality data, emissions data 
provide a better test of the existing theories. Therefore, I use data on SO2 and NOX 
emissions.
6 
                                                 
3 See for example Antweiler et al. (2001), Harbaugh et al. (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2005). 
4 For example, the average standard deviation in SO2 concentrations (for the sixteen countries that report 
concentrations for more than one monitoring station) is 57 percent of the mean SO2 concentrations. 
That for NOX concentration levels (for the twelve countries with more than one reporting monitoring 
stations) is 32 percent. The 1995 data used in this footnote are reported by World Bank’s 1998 World 
Development Index available online at http://www.worldbank.int/nipr/wdi98/index.htm. 
5 Dropping the two outliers in these figures from correlation calculation does not increase the correlation 
significantly. 
6 This study does not explicitly consider the social damage of emissions. In order to get at the social 
damage of pollution emissions, not only the toxicity level but also exposure to these emissions would 
need to be known. I estimate separate models for SO2 and NOX to allow for different toxicity of these 
pollutants. While that is important in getting at the social damage of these emissions, the theoretical 
relationship considered in this study is between the globalization variables and emissions. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that most environmental policies are to limit emissions of a particular pollutant 
and do not account for the toxicity of those emissions. This is potentially due to the greater ease in 
observing emissions.  Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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Figure 1 SO2 Emissions and Mean SO2 Concentrations, 1995 
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
M
e
a
n
 
S
O
2
 
C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
m
i
c
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
/
m
^
3
)
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
SO2 Emissions (gigagrams)
 
 
Figure 2 NOX Emissions and Mean NO2 Concentrations, 1995 
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Sources: Emissions from EMEP (2005) and concentrations from World Bank (1998) 
 
An important aspect of these emissions is that they themselves introduce an 
international interaction. Nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide are both production 
byproducts that pollute the air. Once in the air, these pollutants may travel great 
distances resulting in acid rain and worsened air quality not only in the country of origin 
but in other countries as well. Three international environmental agreements are in 
effect to control their emissions. The Helsinki Protocol required a 30 percent reduction 
of the 1980 sulfur emissions by 1990. In contrast, the Oslo Protocol on sulfur emissions 
provides individual sulfur reduction targets for each country and a longer timeline—
target dates extend from 2000 to 2010. The Sofia Protocol concerning nitrogen oxides 
calls on the participating nations to reduce their emissions to 1987 levels by 1994 and 
provides other guidelines for controlling NOX emissions. While these agreements are 
written and signed at international meetings, nations are not bound by an agreement  
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until they ratify it. Therefore, to capture treaty effects I use the ratification date, not the 
signature date. 
Much of the literature on interactions between globalization and the environment 
focuses on the effect of environmental regulations on trade. The pollution haven effect 
(PHE) predicts that more stringent environmental regulation in a country would 
decrease domestic production and increase imports in the regulated markets. Levinson 
and Taylor (2008) and Ederington and Minier (2003) are two examples of studies that 
focus on the PHE. The goal of my paper is the flip side of the PHE and determines 
how trade affects the environment. Ederington and Minier (2003) control for the effect 
of trade on the environment by endogenizing environmental regulation in the trade 
equation. I make this point more explicit by estimating the equations for emissions. 
Central to the literature on trade’s effect on the environment is the pollution 
haven hypothesis (PHH) that predicts that removal of trade barriers results in flow of 
dirty industries to countries with lax environmental regulations. Taylor (2004) discusses 
the challenges of empirical research in pinning down evidence related to this hypothesis. 
The PHH provides reason to believe that trade affects the environment, as modeled in 
this paper. 
My sample includes European countries alone because I use emissions transport 
matrix only available for Europe and the results should be viewed with this in mind. 
Focusing on a group of geographically small countries packed in relatively close quarters 
provides a good sample to test for cross-border pollution effects. While the estimated 
coefficients may not be the same outside of Europe, the omission of relevant 
globalization variables would most likely cause similar problems in an analysis that 
includes all countries. 
Cole and Elliott (2003) were the first to use international emissions data when 
estimating the impact of trade on the environment. They found mixed results with 
respect to trade’s effect on emissions. Some recent studies, Grether et al. (2010), 
Grether et al. (2009), and Kellenberg (2008), find that trade has decreased emissions. In 
contrast, Managi and Kumar (2009) find a positive effect of trade on emissions and Cole 
(2006) find that trade liberalization increases national energy use.
7 Furthermore, Managi 
et al. (2009) find that trade lowers emissions in OECD countries but that trade increases 
emissions in non-OECD countries, at least for some pollutants. Lamla (2008) finds little 
evidence of trade affecting emissions. Therefore, evidence of trade’s effect on emissions 
is mixed. I believe part of the reason for the mixed results could be driven by omitted 
globalization variables. Most of the previous studies include just trade, and none include 
more than three globalization variables. I find robust evidence that trade lowers 
emissions. 
Unlike previous studies that include no more than three globalization effects, my 
study includes five. In addition to trade, I include cross-border pollution, foreign direct 
investment, neighbors’ wealth and treaty effects in a unified empirical model, and 
explore the potential omitted variable biases caused by inclusion of a subset of these 
                                                 
7 In another study, Cole (2004) uses trade variables to explain the prevalence of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve. He does not provide the net effect of trade on emissions. Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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effects. Omission of the globalization variables typically changes the included 
coefficients significantly.  
The following section outlines the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the 
results and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Empirical Model 
Following Frankel and Rose (2005), pollution emissions are estimated as a 
function of trade, income, and other country characteristics: 
 
   E
it = β
0 + β
1(Trade / GDP)
it + β
2Ln(Inc
it) + β
3[Ln(Inc
it )]
2 + β
4X
it + κ
t + γ
i + ε
it,   i = 1,...,n,( 1 )  
 
where Eit is either log of per capita SO2 or NOX emissions in country i at time t; 
Trade/GDP is trade intensity (or openness) measured by imports plus exports over 
GDP; Inc is national income measured by GDP per capita;  it X  captures other country 
specific characteristics;  t κ  are year fixed effects; γi are country fixed effects and it ε is the 
i.i.d. error term. I estimate this equation using spatial 2SLS, where I instrument for trade 
intensity, income, income squared and the spatial lag. 
Previous literature decomposes the trade effect on emissions into scale, 
composition and technique effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1993; Copeland and Taylor, 
1994, 1995, 2003; and Antweiler et al., 2001). The positive scale effect arises because 
trade tends to increase GDP, which in turn increases industrial production and 
emissions. The composition effect accounts for the changes in emissions due to changes 
in the composition of national output (shifts of production from clean to dirty or from 
dirty to clean industries), which may increase or decrease emissions depending on the 
industries in which a country has a comparative advantage. Finally, the negative 
technique effect is due to increased income resulting in higher demand for cleaner 
production techniques. Because of these opposing effects, the theoretical relationship 
between trade and emissions is ambiguous and remains an empirical question. 
To allow for the inverse-U shaped environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), I include 
the log of income and the square of the log of income. The EKC hypothesis implies 
that as poorer countries’ incomes grow their emissions rise, while an increase in 
wealthier countries’ incomes decrease emissions. The EKC would be supported if the 
linear term of income has a positive coefficient and the quadratic term has a negative 
coefficient. See Grossman and Krueger (1993) for a discussion of the EKC. 
Following Frankel and Rose’s (2005) methodology, I instrument for openness to 
trade, income and income squared due to a potential simultaneity problem. There is a 
two-way link between each of the three variables. First, trade impacts the environment 
through scale, composition and technique effects. On the other hand, the pollution 
haven hypothesis implies that countries with lower environmental regulations export 
dirty goods. Second, the effect of income on environmental quality can be presented as 
the environmental Kuznets curve. However, environmental regulation may also impact  
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income through productivity—either by dampening it or by stimulating it.
8 Finally, the 
gains-from-trade hypothesis implies a positive effect of trade on income while the 
gravity models of trade predict that higher income increases trade. 
Country characteristics are captured by the matrix  it X  which includes the other 
four globalization variables, a corruption index, a repression index, and population 
density. The globalization effects include cross-border pollution, FDI, neighbors’ wealth 
and treaty effects. These, along with the trade intensity variable, are the variables of 
interest in this study. All of these country-specific characteristics are described in detail 
below. 
Cross-border pollution effects are captured with a spatial lag. The spatial lag is 
calculated as the weighted sum of other countries’ emissions,  ωijEjt
i≠ j ∑ . The weight, ωij, 
is the percent of country j’s emissions, Ejt, that cross over to country i. These weights 
are calculated for European countries by the Co-operative Programme for Monitoring 
and Evaluation of the Long Range Transmission of Air Pollutants in Europe (EMEP) 
using atmospheric chemistry models of source and receptor relationships that take into 
account the geography, prevailing winds, and forest cover of both the emitting and 
receiving countries. These emissions-based weights are only available for European 
countries, which is why my sample only includes Europe. The geo-spatial factors 
contributing to cross-border pollution have not changed greatly over the last couple of 
decades, so I use the same weights for all years. The Moran’s I statistic for per capita 
SO2 is 0.312 and the related p-value is 0.001. Similarly, the Moran’s I statistic for per 
capita NOX is 0.293 and the related p-value is 0.001. These statistics provide strong 
evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the dependent variable that I correct for by using 
the spatial lag model. 
Using  Ejt in estimation of Eit  and  Eit  in the estimation of Ejt  introduces an 
endogeneity problem. Therefore, I instrument for cross-border pollution using standard 
instruments for this type of problem, the weighted sums of other exogenous variables. 
The weights used in construction of instruments are the same as the ones used in the 
spatial lag. A similar approach was used by Murdoch et al. (1997) and Murdoch et al. 
(2003) to determine the effect of cross-border pollution on emission-reductions and 
treaty participation. Both of these studies omit trade, FDI and neighbors’ wealth. Using 
a similar method but a different weighting scheme, Maddison (2006) also estimates a 
spatial lag in emissions. His weights are based on a negative function of distance rather 
than pollutant-specific transport matrices used in this study. 
A positive coefficient on the spatial lag could be driven by coordination in 
environmental regulation across countries. For example, Davies and Naughton (2007) 
develop a model that illustrates how cross-border pollution intensifies competition in 
emissions taxes and increases gains from cooperation for nearby countries. If 
environmental regulations tend to move in the same direction in both countries, then 
emissions should also move in the same direction. On the other hand, a country with 
high levels of cross-border pollution will have a higher marginal cost of polluting. This 
effect, also captured by the spatial lag, would decrease domestic pollution. Because I am 
                                                 
8 Porter and Linde (1995) argue that environmental regulation may stimulate productivity. Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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unable to distinguish between these two interactions, the estimated spatial lag coefficient 
will provide the net effect of the two. 
Even though the vast majority of FDI takes place between relatively rich 
countries for market access purposes, some FDI flows from relatively rich countries to 
poorer countries. To the extent that this latter pattern of FDI movement is present in 
Europe, cleaner technology transferred from the richer source country would reduce 
emissions intensity, all else constant.
9 On the other hand, if multinational firms are 
responding to weak environmental regulation in the host country, then FDI could 
increase emissions. The coefficient on FDI will estimate the net effect as in Antweiler et 
al. (2001).  
Neighboring countries’ wealth is calculated as a weighted average of other 
countries’ GDP, where the weights are declining in distance. While there is no theory to 
guide me in the choice of this weight function, I chose the weight of 100 divided by 
distance.
10 The expected sign on neighbors’ wealth is positive and driven by the 
hypothesis that poorer countries near rich countries may serve as pollution havens.  
Similar to Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005), I include the Helsinki and Oslo 
Protocol ratification and participation effects in the SO2 equations and the Sofia 
Protocol effects in the NOX equations. Protocol ratification effects are introduced as 
dummy variables to capture the intercept shifts caused by ratifying the protocols. 
Protocol participation is a variable indicating the number of years since ratification. The 
participation effect captures the Protocol’s effects on emissions trends. The expected 
signs for all treaty effects are negative.  
To control for differences in environmental regulations across countries, I 
construct a repression index from the civil liberties and political rights indices provided 
by Freedom House. This index proxies for citizens’ ability to assert their preferences 
about environmental policy. Civil liberties and political rights take on values between 
one and seven, where lower numbers are associated with higher civil liberties and 
political rights. The repression index I use is the sum of the two divided by fourteen and 
the expected sign is positive—more repression is expected to increase emissions.
 11 
While it is difficult to obtain environmental regulation enforcement data for different 
countries, I use corruption as a proxy for enforcement. Higher corruption should imply 
lower enforcement and higher emissions. Therefore the expected sign on corruption is 
positive. Finally, a standard control included in the model is the log of population 
density. More densely populated countries have higher energy and production needs and 
hence are expected to have higher emissions. The data sources are described in 
                                                 
9 This effect could also be driven by FDI occurring in cleaner industries. 
10 Head and Mayer (2004) introduce a measure of market potential (or what I call neighbors’ wealth) with 
an inverse distance function. Previous studies using market potential find that the choice of the 
functional form for the weights has little effect on their results. See for example Blonigen et al. (2007), 
Blonigen et al. (2007), and Davies and Naughton (2007). 
11 The correlation between the civil liberties and political rights indices is very high (0.8). Combining the 
two into one index allows for both to impact emissions without introducing multicollinearity problems. 
Including either index on its own instead of the repression index does not qualitatively change the 
results.  
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Appendix A and the descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. Also, Table 2 
provides the list of countries and the minimum and the maximum year for each country. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Ln(SO2/Pop)  -10.57  0.84  -12.83  -8.93 
Ln(NOX/Pop) -10.34  0.41  -11.55  -9.20 
Trade/GDP
*  0.69  0.26  0.30  1.82 
Ln(Inbound FDI Stock)  10.01  1.48  4.06  12.99 
Ln(Neighbors Wealth)  7.00  0.30  6.36  7.67 
Helsinki Ratification  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Helsinki Participation  3.42  4.53  0.00  14.00 
Oslo Ratification  0.17  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Oslo Participation  0.28  0.88  0.00  5.00 
Sofia Ratification  0.47  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Sofia Participation  2.31  3.27  0.00  11.00 
Ln(GDP per capita)  9.84  0.68  7.34  10.75 
GDP per capita  22,316  10,449  1,538  46,815 
Square of Ln(GDP per capita)  97.38  12.65  53.85  115.65 
Corruption  2.62  1.75  0.00  8.37 
Repression Index  0.20  0.11  0.14  0.71 
Ln(Density)  4.44  1.00  1.01  6.15 
Sources: Outlined in Appendix A Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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Table 2 List of Countries 
Country Frequency  Min(year)  Max(year) 
Austria  21  1980  2000 
Denmark 21  1980  2000 
Finland  21  1980  2000 
France 21  1980  2000 
Germany  9  1991  1999 
Hungary 16  1985  2000 
Ireland  21  1980  2000 
Italy 20  1980  1999 
Netherlands  21  1980  2000 
Norway 21  1980  2000 
Portugal  15  1980  1998 
Spain 21  1980  2000 
Sweden  21  1980  2000 
Switzerland 21  1980  2000 
Turkey  13  1988  2000 
United Kingdom  21  1980  2000 
Number of observations  304     
 
2.1  Construction of Instruments 
As discussed above, there is simultaneity between openness to trade, income and 
emissions. Therefore, following Frankel and Rose’s (2005) methodology, I construct 
instruments for the trade and income variables in that order. First, I estimate equation 
(2) of bilateral trade using the gravity model of trade.  
 
Ln(Tradeijt /GDP it) = α0 +α1Ln(Distij)+α2Ln(GDPjt)+α 3Ln(Popit)+α 4Ln(Popjt)
+α5Langij +α6Border ij +α 7Ln(Areai)+α8Ln(Areaj)+α9Landlockedij
+α10Xi +α11X j +νt + εijt
 (2) 
 
Log of trade as a share of GDP from country i to country j is estimated as a 
function of log of distance between the two countries, log of country j’s GDP, log of 
each of the countries’ population, dummies for common language and land border, log 
of each of the countries’ areas, and a variable indicating whether neither country, one 
country or both countries are landlocked. Equation (2) is a modified version of Frankel 
and Rose’s (2005) specification—I have added country j’s GDP and country i’s  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
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population. In addition, I have included all the exogenous variables from equation (1) 
for each country (Xi  and X j). The latter modification moves this method closer to 
netting out the effects of X from the instrument for Trade/GDP in equation (1). 
Furthermore, I do not restrict the coefficients on the two countries’ areas to be the 
same as Frankel and Rose’s original specification does. 
Equation (2) is estimated for 1980-2000 with year fixed effects. Each trade flow is 
only included once in the estimation equation. That is, if Tradeijt / GDP it  is included in 
the estimation, then 
   
Tradejit / GDPjt  is excluded from the analysis. When constructing 
the instrument each observation is used twice—once for estimation of total trade flows 
of each country. The instrument for openness in country i is constructed by taking the 
exponent of the estimated log of trade flows to each country j and summing over all j 
countries as presented in equation (3)
12: 
 
  
(Trade /GDP)
Estimated
it = exp[Ln(Tradeijt /GDP it
Estimated
)]
j≠i ∑
      (3) 
 
The second step involves constructing an instrument for income and income 
squared. I instrument for openness in the income equation below because of the 
potentially endogenous relationship between trade and income. Log of income is 
estimated using IV estimation as a function of openness to trade, log of population, log 
of income lagged twenty years, investment rate, population growth rate, log of education 
and the set of exogenous variables from equation (1), X:  
 
   
Ln(Incit) = δ1(Trade / GDP)it +δ2Ln(Popit)+δ3Ln(Inci,t−20)+
                  δ4Invit +δ5PopGRit +δ6Ln(Educit)+δ6Xit +γ t + εit     (4) 
 
Equation (4) is also estimated for 1980-2000 and includes year fixed effects. The 
major modification from Frankel and Rose (2005) is again the addition of the exogenous 
variables from the final equation of interest. As before, this gets me closer to netting out 
the effects of X from the instruments for the income variables in equation (1). The 
predicted values from equation (4) are used to instrument for log of income and the 
square of these predicted values are used to instrument for square of log of income.
 13  
 
                                                 
12 Taking the exponents provide the median not the mean of Trade
ijt / GDP
it . For comparability of 
methods across studies I use this method of constructing the instrument. 
13 See Frankel and Rose (2002) for further discussion of developing these instruments. Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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3. Results 
This section presents the fixed effects model results for logged per capita SO2 and 
NOX emissions. Therefore, time-series variation drives the results. The preferred 
specification is presented in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4 and includes all five 
globalization variables. I then examine the omitted variable bias by sequentially 
removing one of the five globalization variables from the model. The section concludes 
with discussion of additional findings and robustness checks. 
3.1 Baseline  Results   
In each of the baseline models, four of the five globalization effects are 
statistically significant. For both types of emissions, I find that increase in trade intensity 
reduces per capita emissions with a larger effect for SO2. Spatial lag is positive for both 
emissions but statistically significant for just SO2. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that countries may be coordinating their environmental regulations with 
nearby countries. For 1980-2000, inbound FDI stock in Europe increase per capita 
emissions on average, consistent with the idea that FDI might be locating in areas with 
less stringent environmental regulations. Neighbors’ wealth affects SO2 negatively and 
NOX positively. The unexpected negative effect in the SO2 equation matches the 
coefficient found by Maddison (2006) and appears with the inclusion of fixed effects. 
This unexpected negative sign on neighbors’ wealth may be explained by the SO2 has 
larger regional effects through acid rain while NOX cause more problems at a local level 
(Burtraw and Szambelan 2009). Therefore, a country that is surrounded by wealthier 
countries could be used for production of goods with local emissions (more of a feature 
of NOX) but per haps is pressured to produce less of goods with regional effects (SO2). 
Treaty ratification and participation variables in the SO2 model are statistically 
insignificant in the SO2 equations but are statistically significant for the Sofia Protocol in 
the NOX models. The income and income-squared variables have the expected signs. 
Repression index and corruption are statistically insignificant in the baseline regressions 
and density decreases per capita NOX emissions. 
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Table 3 Ln(SO2/Pop) Equations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All  No 
Trade  No Lag  No FDI  No 
Wealth 
No 
Treaties 
-1.797***   0.433  -0.848**  -1.797*** -1.192*** 
Trade/GDP 
(0.536)   (1.059) (0.383) (0.550) (0.396) 
0.180***  0.141***    0.131**  0.238***  0.139** 
Spatial Lag (W*Eit) 
(0.064)  (0.054)    (0.055)  (0.062)  (0.056) 
0.175** 0.027  -0.055    0.196***  0.082  Ln(Inbound FDI 
Stock)  (0.072) (0.048) (0.105)   (0.073) (0.054) 
Ln(Neighbors 
Wealth)  -5.496***  -5.097***  -6.088***  -5.690***    -5.396*** 
(W*GDP)  (1.454)  (1.243)  (1.325)  (1.316)    (1.288) 
0.049 0.015 0.067 0.056 -0.036    Helsinki 
Ratification  (0.084) (0.072) (0.078) (0.078) (0.082)  
0.023  -0.014  -0.022  0.005  0.021   
Oslo Ratification 
(0.017)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.017)   
-0.042 -0.030 0.041  -0.020 -0.058   Helsinki 
Participation  (0.087) (0.076) (0.088) (0.079) (0.088)  
-0.021  0.038  0.074  0.022  -0.024   
Oslo Participation 
(0.039)  (0.030)  (0.055)  (0.032)  (0.040)   
43.566*** 30.006*** 34.069*** 39.327*** 40.287*** 40.160***  Ln(GDP per 
capita)  (6.727) (5.027) (8.054) (6.227) (6.763) (3.409) 
-2.067***  -1.473***  -1.720***  -1.914***  -1.895***  -1.956***  Square of Ln (GDP 
per capita)  (0.331)  (0.261)  (0.374)  (0.308)  (0.332)  (0.177) 
-0.582 -0.914**  -1.393***  -1.357***  -0.106 -0.908** 
Repression Index 
(0.460) (0.385) (0.468) (0.319) (0.447) (0.377) 
0.044  0.034  0.027  0.048*  0.052*  0.041 
Corruption 
(0.029)  (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
0.836 1.527*  1.412 0.784 0.801 0.947 
Ln(Density) 
(0.972) (0.819) (0.943) (0.883) (0.983) (0.875) 
Observations  304  304  304  304  304  304 
R-Squared (within)  0.840 0.882 0.863 0.868 0.836 0.864 
F-test for fixed 
effects  57.49  85.78  69.52  78.39  62.57  85 
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All equations include a constant, year fixed effects and country fixed effects. Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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3.2  Omission of One Relevant Variable 
In columns (2)-(6) of Table 3 and Table 4 I sequentially remove one of the five 
globalization effects from the model. Removing trade from the model turns FDI stock 
insignificant in the model. Removing the spatial lag from the SO2 model biases the trade 
and the FDI stock variables and removing the spatial lag from the NOX model removes 
the statistically significant Sofia treaty effects. Removing FDI stock from the model 
biases the trade coefficient for each of the emissions. Omitting neighbor’s wealth 
variable does not significantly affect other variables’ coefficients but is statistically 
significant in the baseline equation. Excluding treaty effects from the SO2 equation 
makes FDI stock insignificant but omitting the statistically significant treaty effects from 
the NOX equation leaves the rest of the coefficients qualitatively unchanged.  
 
Table 4 Ln(NOX/Pop) Equations 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  All  No Trade  No Lag  No FDI  No Wealth  No Treaties 
-0.691***   -0.937*** -0.312*  -0.652*** -0.835*** 
Trade/GDP 
(0.202)   (0.295) (0.187) (0.200)  (0.225) 
0.029  0.024    0.007  0.021  0.031 
Spatial Lag (W*Eit) 
(0.026)  (0.024)    (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.027) 
0.099*** 0.039  0.140***   0.092***  0.109*** 
Ln(Inbound FDI Stock) 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.046)   (0.035)  (0.040) 
1.319*  0.851  1.626*  1.454*    1.626**  Ln(Neighbors Wealth) 
(W*GDP)  (0.758)  (0.716)  (0.858)  (0.798)    (0.801) 
-0.110** -0.189*** -0.081  -0.101** -0.112***  
Sofia Ratification 
(0.043) (0.038) (0.052) (0.045) (0.043)   
-0.020**  -0.034***  -0.009  -0.008  -0.023**   
Sofia Participation 
(0.010)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.009)   
12.327*** 6.506***  14.907*** 14.089*** 11.705***  16.657*** 
Ln(GDP per capita) 
(2.299) (2.084) (2.896) (2.457) (2.275)  (1.994) 
-0.513***  -0.254**  -0.616***  -0.609***  -0.485***  -0.723***  Square of Ln (GDP per 
capita)  (0.117)  (0.110)  (0.144)  (0.124)  (0.117)  (0.109) 
0.031 -0.011  0.086 -0.497*** -0.066  0.039 
Repression Index 
(0.219) (0.208) (0.248) (0.187) (0.207)  (0.238) 
-0.008  0.001  -0.022  -0.016  -0.009  -0.023 
Corruption 
(0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
-1.300** -1.428***  -0.979 -1.269**  -1.270** -1.191** 
Ln(Density) 
(0.517) (0.492) (0.598) (0.538) (0.516)  (0.565) 
Observations  304  304  304  304  304  304 
R-Squared  (within)  0.619 0.653 0.515 0.574 0.624  0.559 
F-test for fixed effects  57.37  69.63  45.63  51.09  65.00  53.34 
(p-value)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All equations include a constant, year fixed effects and 
country fixed effects.  
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Overall, I find that removal of just one globalization effect, even if insignificant in 
the baseline equation, can severely bias included globalization coefficients. This then 
suggests that previous studies may have results that are biased since no previous study 
on emissions includes more than three of these globalization effects. 
3.3  Additional Findings and Robustness Checks 
The models discussed so far employ time-series variation. A previous version of 
this paper focused on regressions without country fixed effects and found similar results 
that omitting any of the five globalization effects biased the included coefficients. I also 
estimated the models for logged values of emissions/GDP, emissions/area and total 
emissions. The patterns of omitted variable biases for these additional equations are 
similar and sometimes more severe than in the reported results. These results are 
available by request. 
4. Conclusion 
Empirical work is always a balancing act between choosing a simple model that 
answers the question of interest and ensuring that all the relevant variables are included 
in the model. This study brings together different strands of literature that estimate the 
impacts of globalization on emissions. The central focus in the past has been on the 
effect of trade on the environment. When I include four additional globalization 
variables in the model I find robust results of trade intensity reducing emissions.  
The globalization effects included in the preferred model are openness to trade, 
cross-border pollution, FDI, neighboring countries’ wealth and treaty effects. Previous 
studies usually include these effects on their own and no one has included more than 
three of these in one model. My results suggest that excluding any of the globalization 
variables one at a time or in groups significantly biases some of the included 
coefficients. This can explain the mixed results of previous studies.  Helen T. Naughton, Globalization and Emissions in Europe 
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Appendix A: Data Sources 
The emissions data come from the EMEP (2005) and are country level sulfur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions for nineteen European countries for 
1980-2000 measured in gigagrams. The spatial lag is constructed using emissions 
transport matrices, or blame matrices, for SO2 and NOX as reported by the 
Meteorological Synthesizing Centre—West (MSC-W, 2002). When calculating the 
dependent variables, the logarithmic versions always use emissions in gigagrams, 
population in thousands, GDP in dollars and area in km
2. The linear versions of the 
variables were scaled so that the coefficients would be easier to read. Total emissions 
were scaled down by 1000. Per capita emissions were scaled up by 10
5. 
Trade as a fraction of GDP, GDP per capita, population and density come from 
2004 World Development Indicators compiled by World Bank. All money values used 
in this analysis are in 1995 US dollars. FDI is measured as inbound FDI stock and is 
obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development online at 
http://stats.unctad.org/fdi. Corruption is measured by 10-CPI, where CPI is the 
Corruption Perceptions Index decreasing in corruption provided by Transparency 
International online at http://www.transparency.org. The civil liberties and political 
rights indices that I use in construction of the repression index are reported by Freedom 
House online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm. The treaty-related 
data come from the United Nations’ Treaty Database. Table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics.  
Bilateral trade data are reported by Feenstra et al. (2005) online at 
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu. To convert the trade data into constant 1995 US dollars I 
use the US GDP deflator as reported by the Economic Report of the President. Data 
for distances between countries, common language, common border, area and whether 
or not a country is landlocked come from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) available online at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
Investment as a share of GDP is reported by Penn World Tables 6.1 and is 
averaged over all available years. Population growth rate for a given year in a country is 
calculated based on the preceding twenty years. Education measured as average years of 
schooling for people aged over 25 come from the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset available 
online at http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/. These data are reported every five years 
between 1960 and 2000. I interpolate the data for intermittent years.  
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